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The concept of ‘internal judicial independence’ in
the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights
Joost Sillen*
Internal judicial independence as a new element of the case law of the Strasbourg
Court on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – The Court
has only found violations of internal judicial independence in cases against former
communist countries – Relevance of the case law for other member states of the
Council of Europe – Internal judicial independence as part of the requirement of
an impartial tribunal? – Importance of the independence of the individual judge
Introduction
The concept of internal judicial independence is intended to protect judges from
undue pressure from within the judiciary. The concept was ﬁrst mentioned in
international soft law and in professional standards in the early 1980s.1 Around
the turn of the millennium, the concept became more widespread.2 In 1999 it was
included in the Universal Charter of the Judge3 and in 2007 in the Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct.4 In 2008, the Mount Scopus International
Standards of Judicial Independence followed suit.5 In 2010 it received recognition
in the Magna Carta of Judges and in the inﬂuential Recommendations of the
*Dr. J.J.J. Sillen is Associate Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at Radboud
University, Nijmegen, Netherlands; email j.sillen@jur.ru.nl. I am grateful to the anonymous
reviewers for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1Art. 47 of the Minimum standards of judicial independence of the International Bar Association
(1982); Art. 2.03 of the Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (1983).
2 I do not address domestic law in this article.
3Art. 2 IAJ of theUniversal Charter of the Judge (Central Council of the International Association
of Judges, 1999).
4Art. 1.4 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2007).
5Art. 9 of the Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (International
Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, 2008)
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Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.6 The European Court of
Human Rights acknowledged this aspect of judicial independence explicitly for
the ﬁrst time in 2009 after it had done so implicitly as early as 2000. Although the
acknowledgement of internal judicial independence by the Strasbourg Court ﬁts
in with this international trend, it also marks a turning point, as it was the ﬁrst
time the concept was acknowledged by an international tribunal whose judgments
are binding on states.7
The recognition of the concept of internal judicial independence by the
Strasbourg Court also signalled a clear turning point for the Court itself.
Previously, it viewed judicial independence almost exclusively from a separation of
powers perspective.8 This approach was based on the idea of an independent
judiciary as a necessary safeguard against the legislative and executive branches.
The reasoning was that to fulﬁl this safeguarding function, it was imperative for the
judiciary to be separated from the other two branches of government. Especially
after World War II, there was a growing awareness that such a separation was
necessary. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights conﬁrmed this; the
drafters, in 1948, included the right to ‘an independent […] tribunal’.9 The
Declaration inspired the drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights
(the Convention) to incorporate a similar right in Article 6 of the Convention.10
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the Strasbourg Court interpreted Article 6
in an increasingly stringent manner. In numerous judgments, it stated that ‘the
concept of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary … has
assumed growing importance in the case-law of the Court’.11 Although the
Strasbourg Court consistently stressed that it did not prescribe a speciﬁc theory of
6Art. 2 of the Magna Carta of Judges (Consultative Council of European Judges, 2010);
Recommendation 22-25 of CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers [of the Council of
Europe] to member states on judges: independence, efﬁciency and responsibilities (2010).
7Art. 46 of the Convention. However, the Strasbourg Court is meanwhile not the only
international court, whose judgments are binding on the states, that acknowledges the concept of
internal judicial independence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has followed its
example. See e.g. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 23 August 2013, Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coella
et al.) v Ecuador, paras. 49-51 (‘the internal aspect [of judicial independence, JS] protects the judge as
an individual even from the rest of the judicial system’).
8There are exceptions to this rule. In some cases, the Court has also stated that judicial
independence refers to the independence of the parties to proceedings. See e.g. ECtHR 16 July 1971,
Case No. 2614/65, Ringeisen v Austria, para. 95. In the literature on the Court’s case law, however,
the separation of powers perspective dominates.
9Art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
10See the preamble to the Convention.
11E.g. ECtHR 28May 2002, Case No. 46 295/99, Stafford vUK, para. 78; ECtHR 6May 2003,
Case No. 39 343/98, 39 651/98, 43 147/98 and 46 664/99, Kleyn et al. v The Netherlands, para.
193; ECtHR 22 June 2004, Case no. 47 221/99, Pabla Ky v Finland, para. 29; ECtHR 6 November
2018, Case No. 55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v Portugal, para.
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separation of powers, its case law nonetheless became a driving force in perfecting
the separation of the judiciary from, most importantly, the executive branch.12
The idea that the Convention should also protect judges against pressure from
judges and other judicial ofﬁcials within the judiciary went beyond this separation
of powers perspective. This stemmed from the idea that the separation of powers
itself does not sufﬁciently guarantee the independent administration of justice.
Instead, it is also necessary that the individual judge hold a sufﬁciently
autonomous position within the judiciary.
Since 2000, the Strasbourg Court has found a violation of internal judicial
independence in 14 cases, with judgments issued against a limited number of
countries in Eastern Europe, namely Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Their Communist past can explain this geographical
concentration. Two circumstances in these countries tend to increase the chance
of violations of internal judicial independence occurring. First, they lack a
longstanding, deeply engrained judicial culture that values the autonomy of the
individual judge. During Communist rule, which lasted until the late 1980s in
these countries, there was no independent judiciary. On the contrary, there were
close ties between the Communist Party and the judiciary. The fact that the courts
were organised in a hierarchical and authoritarian manner further reduced the
autonomy of individual judges.13 After the fall of the Communist regimes, and
notwithstanding the profound democratic developments in these countries,
aspects of this judicial culture remained entrenched.14 Second, the way in which
the judiciary in these countries was organised after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 enhanced the consequences of the absence of a culture of autonomy of
individual judges. At the time, many of the former Communist countries opted
for a model of judicial self-government. This choice was not entirely voluntary. To
become a member of the European Union, which many of these countries aspired
to, they had to meet the Copenhagen criteria set out in 1993 by the European
144. See D. Kosař, ‘Policing Separation of Powers: A New Role for the European Court of Human
Rights?’, 8(1) EuConst (2012) p. 33.
12The development of the case law of the Strasbourg Court described above is sketched in broad
strokes. The reality is, of course, more nuanced. For example, although the ECtHR has emphasised
the importance of the judiciary being separate from the other government branches, it has never
expressed any doubts regarding the Appellate Committee of the House Lords. Nevertheless, the
Strasbourg case law on Art. 6 of the Convention ‘strengthened the argument’ for abolishment of the
Appellate Committee (David Hope, ‘The Reform of the House of Lords’, 60(2) Revue Internationale
de Droit Comparé (2008) p. 260).
13D. Kosař, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies (Cambridge University
Press 2017) p. 132-133, with further references.
14Kosař, supra n. 13, p. 3-4 and 132-134. See also A. Nußberger, ‘Judicial Reforms in Post-Soviet
Countries – Good Intentions with Flawed Results?’, in A. Seibert-Fohr (eds.), Judicial Independence
in Transition (Heidelberg: Springer 2012) p. 885–907.
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Council. One of these criteria calls for the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing
[…] the rule of law’, in particular regarding the administration of justice.15 Partly
under the inﬂuence of international soft law,16 which is often formulated by
judges, the European Commission interpreted this criterion in such a way that
neither the executive nor legislative branch, but rather the judiciary must take
decisions on its budget and the appointment, promotion and dismissal of
judges.17 In this way, judicial self-government became the standard in many
Eastern and Central European countries.18 Although such judicial self-
government enhances the institutional independence of the judicial system as a
whole, it also has potential drawbacks. Especially in countries whose judicial
ofﬁcials have not been brought up in a culture that values the independence of
individual judges, the autonomy of judges can suffer; in a system of judicial self-
government, there is no external oversight to counter these judicial ofﬁcials.
Against this background, the aim of this article is threefold. First, I will provide
an analysis of the concept of ‘internal judicial independence’ in the Court’s case
law. Although there is a growing body of literature that explores the importance of
the concept,19 no extensive analysis of the Strasbourg case law on internal judicial
15See <www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf> , visited 15 January 2019.
The transition towards an independent judicial branch in these countries started earlier. See
R. Coman, ‘Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and
Eastern Europe’, 66(6) Europe-Asia Studies (2004) p. 892; P.C. Magelhães, ‘The Politics of Judicial
Reform in Eastern Europe’, 32(1) Comparative Politics (1999) p. 43; D. Piana, ‘The Power Knocks at
the Court’s Back Door. Two Waves of Postcommunist Judicial Reforms’, 42(6) Comparative
Political Studies (2009) p. 816.
16M. Bobek and D. Kosař, ‘Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial
Councils in Central and Eastern Europe’, 15(7) German Law Journal (2014) p. 1263.
17A. Seibert-Fohr, ‘Judicial Independence in European Union Accessions: The Emergence of a
European Basic Principle’, German Yearbook of International Law (2009) p. 423; D. Kochenov, EU
Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy
and the Rule of Law (Kluwer 2009) p. 259 ff.
18Bobek and Kosař, supra n. 16, p. 1266. The best-known exception is the Czech Republic.
There, the Ministry of Justice Model is applied, which paradoxically enough operates as a form of
judicial self-rule. See Kosař, supra n. 13, p. 5 and D. Kosař, ‘Politics of Judicial Independence and
Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents
and the Ministry of Justice’, 13(1) EuConst (2017) p. 96.
19See e.g. S.B. Burbank, B. Friedman and D. Goldberg, ‘Introduction’, in S.B. Burbank and B.
Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Sage
Publications 2002) p. 30; C. Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Europe: Threat or Resource for
Democracy’, 49(3) Representation (2013) p. 347; R.D. Lefever, ‘The Integration of Judicial
Independence and Judicial Administration. The Role of Collegiality in Court Governance’, 24(2)
The Court Manager (2009) p. 5; D. Kosař, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies
(Cambridge University Press 2017) p. 408–409; Kosař, supra n. 18, p. 114-122; M. Popova,
Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies. A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge
University Press 2012) p. 134–139; P.H. Russel, ‘Towards a General Theory of Judicial
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independence is available. Second, I will show that, although the Court has only
found violations of internal judicial independence in cases against former
Communist countries, the concept of internal judicial independence is also
relevant for the established democracies party to the Council of Europe. To that
end, I will present a case study in which I apply the Strasbourg case law on internal
judicial independence to the Netherlands. Third, I will offer a critique of the
Court’s case law.
I will argue that the Strasbourg case law on internal judicial independence
amounts to a fundamental change in what Kosař and Lixinski call the ‘judicial
design agenda’ of the Strasbourg Court.20 Until now this fundamental change has
not been reﬂected by any adjustment of the interpretation of the two founding
concepts in the case law on Article 6 of the Convention: independence and
impartiality. For the conceptual clarity of the Strasbourg case law and, therefore,
for its effectiveness and persuasiveness, however, I think that such an adjustment is
needed. To that end, I will propose several adjustments to the Court’s case law.
I will proceed as follows. After remarking on the methodology applied, I will
discuss and systematise the relevant case law. Next, I will demonstrate the
relevance of the concept of internal judicial independence for established
democracies, offer a critique of the Court’s case law, and propose a number of
improvements. Finally, I will draw a brief conclusion.
Methodology
According to the Strasbourg Court, the concept of internal judicial independence
is part of Article 6.1 of the Convention. The relevant provision reads as follows:
‘… everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law’.
How the Court ﬁts this new aspect of judicial independence into its case law on
Article 6 is clearly shown in Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia (2009). First, it summarises
its case law on the requirement of an independent tribunal:
‘The Court … reiterates that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be
considered “independent” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter
alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of ofﬁce, the
Independence’, in P.H. Russel and D.M. O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy.
Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University Press of Virginia 2001) p. 1.
20D. Kosař and L. Lixinski, ‘Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts’,
109(4) The American Journal of International Law (2015) p. 714.
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existence of safeguards against outside pressures and the question whether it presents
an appearance of independence’.21
Next, the Court argues that this provision requires more than just freedom from
outside pressure:
‘However, judicial independence demands that individual judges be free not only
from undue inﬂuences outside the judiciary, but also from within. This internal
judicial independence requires that they be free from directives or pressures from the
fellow judges or those who have administrative responsibilities in the court such as
the president of the court or the president of a division in the court. The absence of
sufﬁcient safeguards securing the independence of judges within the judiciary and,
in particular, vis-à-vis their judicial superiors, may lead the Court to conclude that
an applicant’s doubts as to the (independence and) impartiality of a court may be
said to have been objectively justiﬁed’.22
When determining the consequences of a violation of internal judicial
independence, it should be noted that only in very few cases has the Court
focused on the requirement that tribunals be ‘independent’.23 In most cases, such
as in Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, the Court has emphasised the requirement that
tribunals be ‘impartial’. In other cases, a violation of internal judicial
independence has led the Court to the conclusion that there was no ‘tribunal
established by law’ – another requirement of Article 6.1.24 This judgment usually
follows when an ofﬁcial of the judiciary has taken a case away from a judge and the
Court ﬁnds that by doing so it had created the impression that an attempt had
been made to inﬂuence the outcome of the case.25 Because a violation of internal
judicial independence can thus lead to a violation of the various requirements laid
down in Article 6, the case law I will discuss has not been selected on the basis of
which requirement the Court deemed had been breached, but rather on the
substance of the Court’s considerations that underlies those judgments.
The case law that I will discuss here was selected by consulting Hudoc, the case
law database of the Strasbourg Court.26 I did not conﬁne my search to ‘judgments’
but also included ‘decisions’ of the Court dealing with Article 6.1. As noted above,
the number of cases in which the Court has dealt with internal judicial
21ECtHR 22 December 2009, Case No. 24810/06, Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, para. 86 (internal
references omitted).
22 ibid.
23Khrykin v Russia; ECtHR 19 April 2011, Case No. 33 188/08, Baturlova v Russia; ECtHR 3
May 2011, Case No. 30024/02, Sutyagin v Russia.
24E.g. ECtHR 12 January 2016, Case No. 57774/13, Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary, para. 67.
25 ibid., para. 58.
26See < hudoc.echr.coe.int> .
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independence is quite limited.27 Only 15 judgments and 3 relevant decisions were
found in the period between 2000 and 2018.28
Systematic analysis of the case law
Although the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court in its case law usually focusses strictly
on the individual case in question, meaning that judgments in which the Court
explains the role that it plays in the body of case law as a whole or in which it formulates
general rules are rare,29 this, I think, does not prevent us from summarising its case law
on internal judicial independence in a single legal rule. This rule runs as follows:
Internal judicial independence is breached if
(1) a colleague
(2) who can exert pressure on the judge
(3) tries to inﬂuence the judge’s decision in a concrete case.
I will discuss the various elements of this rule in the light of the Court’s
case law.
A Colleague …
Internal judicial independence, as deﬁned by the Court, bears on the relationship
between judges or between a judge and other judicial ofﬁcials. In Parlov-Tkalčić v
Croatia the Court states:
27This search extended through 15 November 2018. Subsequent cases are not considered here.
28ECtHR 10 October 2000, Case No. 42095/98, Daktaras v Lithuania; ECtHR 6 September
2005, Case No. 65518/01, Salov v Ukraine; ECtHR 3 May 2007, Case No. 7577/02, Bochan v
Ukraine; ECtHR 26 July 2007, Case No. 29294/02, Hirschhorn v Romania; ECtHR 9 October
2008, Case No. 62936/00, Moiseyev v Russia; ECtHR [DA] 14 May 2009, Case No. 2329/05,
Zaytsev v Russia; ECtHR [DA] 17 November 2009, Case No. 39279/05, Iwańńczuk v Poland;
Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21; ECtHR 15 July 2010, Case No. 16695/04, Gazeta Ukraine-
Tsentr v Ukraine; ECtHR 5 October 2010, Case No. 19334/03, DMD Group, a.s. v Slovakia;
ECtHR 3 February 2011, Case No. 8921/05, Igor Kabanov v Russia; ECtHR 19 April 2011, Case
No. 33186/08, Khrykin v Russia; supra n. 23; Baturlova v Russia, supra n. 23; ECtHR 3 May 2011,
Case No. 30024/02, Sutyagin v Russia; ECtHR 6 October 2011, Case No. 23465/03, Agrokompleks
v Ukraine; ECtHR [DA] 7 July 2015, Case No. 24876/07, Lorenzetti v Italy; Miracle Europe Kft v
Hungary, supra n. 24; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v Portugal, supra n. 11.
29This does not take away from the fact that fewer judgments by the Court are case-bound (J.H.
Gerards, General Principles of the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge University
Press 2019, forthcoming) ch. 2). An example of this (related to internal judicial independence) is
Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, para. 86.
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‘[I]nternal judicial independence requires that [individual judges, JS] be free from
directives or pressures from the fellow judges or those who have administrative
responsibilities in the court such as the president of the court or the president of a
division in the court’.30
Internal judicial independence thus regulates the relationship between judges,
i.e. between a member of a judicial panel and its chairman, but it also pertains
to the relationship between a judge and ‘his’ court executives.31 It also applies
to court executives who are themselves not involved in judging, as Parlov-
Tkalčić also shows. In that case the Court held that the applicant’s doubts that
the judges in his case were inﬂuenced by their court president were objectively
justiﬁed, although court presidents under Croatian law only perform
‘administrative (managerial and organizational) functions which are strictly
separated from the judicial function, that is, from adjudication of individual
cases’.32
From the Court’s deﬁnition, it follows that when pressure is exerted on a judge
by anyone other than a judicial ofﬁcial, the concept of internal judicial
independence does not apply. Usually, this distinction is easy to make.
Sometimes, however, it is not. I will discuss two examples. First, does internal
judicial independence apply when the pressure on a judge originates from a body
consisting of judicial ofﬁcials and other (non-judicial) ofﬁcials? Denisov v Ukraine
is an example of such a case.33 Denisov, the presiding judge of the Kyiv
Administrative Court of Appeal, was dismissed from the ofﬁce of president by the
High Council of Justice, whose membership consists largely of non-judicial staff,
including the Prosecutor-General and other representatives of the prosecutorial
system.34 Denisov then unsuccessfully challenged his dismissal before the Higher
Administrative Court. Before the Strasbourg Court, Denisov argued that the
Ukrainian Administrative Court had not provided him with access to an
independent and impartial tribunal because its members were under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Council of Justice, whose decision was the
subject of the appeal. The Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court agreed with
the applicant. However, it did not specify whether this violation of Article 6 of the
30Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, para. 86.
31Apart from this, I am not aware of any other cases in which the Strasbourg Court has
complained about unjustiﬁed inﬂuence by a judicial ofﬁcial other than a court executive. Thus,
violations of internal judicial independence by fellow judges who have no executive tasks do not
occur. This is probably because such fellow judges without executive tasks also lack the powers
necessary to exert inﬂuence.
32Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, para. 88.
33ECtHR 25 September 2018, Case No. 76639/11, Denisov v Ukraine, para. 79.
34 ibid., para. 69.
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Convention amounted to a violation of external or internal judicial independence.
In my opinion, the concept of internal judicial independence did not apply in this
case since the majority of the members of the High Council of Justice were not
judicial ofﬁcials.35
Another situation in which it is not immediately clear whether the concept of
internal judicial independence applies is when judicial ofﬁcials, in pressuring a
judge, act in line with the wishes of government ofﬁcials from outside the
judiciary and thus act as transmission belts for another branch of government.36
In such cases, the Court considers both internal and external independence to be
applicable, as in Agrokompleks v Ukraine. Agrokompleks had supplied 375,000
tonnes of crude oil to LyNOS, a company whose majority-owner was the
Ukrainian government. However, LyNOS, in turn, delivered only a small part of
the agreed-upon oil products to Agrokompleks. A domestic court established that
LyNOS had defaulted on its contractual obligations and ordered payment of
about €19.5 million to Agrokompleks. After that judgment had become ﬁnal, the
government started an inquiry into the liabilities of LyNOS to its creditors, upon
which it was concluded that the outstanding liability to Agrokompleks was in fact
much lower than the court had established. LyNOS relied on that conclusion as a
newly-discovered circumstance and applied for a review of the court order by a
panel of the court. The court, ﬁnding that the government report did not contain
new information, upheld its ruling.37 The president of the court, however, after
receiving numerous letters from various government ofﬁcials including the
Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, and the President of Ukraine urging
him to repeal or reconsider the court’s decisions,38 instructed his two deputies to
review that latest ruling.39 The court then proceeded to reverse its earlier ruling.40
The Strasbourg Court held that the interference of these government ofﬁcials
with the court proceedings constituted a violation of external judicial
independence as laid down in Article 6 of the Convention.41 However, the
Court also ruled that the instruction given by the president of the court to his
two deputies asking them to reconsider the earlier judgment was itself in
35The Court attaches particular importance to this majority-rule in judicial councils. See ECtHR
9 January 2013, Case No. 21722/11, Oleksandr Volkov v Urkaine, paras. 109 and 112.
36On the transmission-belt thesis with regard to court presidents, especially in Central and
Eastern European countries, see e.g. Kosař, supra n. 13, p. 99-100 and p. 391-398; Popova, supra n.
19, p. 139-145.
37Agrokompleks v Ukraine, supra n. 28, para. 69.
38 ibid., para. 13.
39 ibid., paras. 70 and 138.
40 ibid., paras. 71-72.
41The Court labelled this intervention ‘unacceptable’ (ibid., para. 135).
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contravention of the Convention as it, too, violated the principle of internal
judicial independence.42
…who can exert pressure on the judge …
Not every judicial colleague is equally relevant when investigating a violation of
internal judicial independence. Only colleagues capable of exerting pressure on a
judge are of importance here. Whether a colleague can apply such pressure is
determined by the Strasbourg Court on the basis of the powers that the colleague
in question has.43
Some powers are not relevant for this purpose. For example, the Court also
takes into account that, within courts, the exercise of certain managerial powers –
and the ensuing pressure – is inevitable:
‘It has to be borne in mind that any supervision of the work of judges involves a
certain risk to their internal independence and that it is impossible to devise a system
that would completely eliminate that risk’.44
The mere fact that a colleague has executive power over a judge, for example,
because he is the president of the court to which the judge is assigned, is therefore
insufﬁcient to justify the assumption that he can exert pressure on the judge to
such an extent that it could result in a violation of internal judicial
independence.45
When examining whether a judicial colleague can exert pressure on the judge,
the Court looks at whether one of the following two circumstances apply: has the
colleague (a) exercised powers with regard to the handling of a case that is or has
been assigned to the judge, or (b) does he have the power to change the legal status
of the judge?
42 ibid., para. 139.
43See, e.g., Lorenzetti v Italy, supra n. 28, para. 52.
44 ibid., para. 91.
45Only in exceptional cases will an investigation into these powers not be conducted.
Agrokompleks vUkraine, supra n. 28, is an example of such an exception. The Court concluded in this
case that the inﬂuence exerted on the judge had come from his judicial superior, without addressing
the latter’s powers with respect to the judge (para. 139). The fact that the Court chose not to conduct
a detailed investigation was perhaps because a violation of Art. 6 ECHR had already been established
on other grounds and because of the barely-concealed manner in which the pressure had been
exerted.
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Powers exercised with regard to the handling of a case
When examining whether a colleague has used powers with regard to the handling
of a case, this usually concerns the power to assign a case to a particular judge or
panel of judges or the right to appoint a judge-rapporteur.46 Daktaras v Lithuania
illustrates both elements.
The applicant had been convicted by a court of ﬁrst instance as the principal
offender in a blackmail charge.47 On appeal, that judgment was amended in that
the applicant was no longer regarded as the principal offender but only as a
secondary party to the crime. However, the penalty remained the same.48
Subsequently, the judge who had pronounced judgment at the Court of First
Instance asked the President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court to
lodge a petition with the Supreme Court requesting the repeal of the Court of
Appeal’s judgment.49 The President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme
Court granted that request and petitioned the Supreme Court to repeal the
judgment of the Court of Appeal as it had erred in applying the law and had
wrongly held that the applicant was not the principal offender. The President
asked the Supreme Court to uphold the judgment by the Court of First Instance
instead.50 Subsequently, he appointed a Chamber of three judges of the Criminal
Division of the Supreme Court to examine the case, and he appointed a judge-
rapporteur.51 The Chamber of the Supreme Court subsequently overturned the
judgment of the Court of Appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of First
Instance.52 In Strasbourg, the applicant complained that the Chamber of the
Supreme Court that had heard the petition could not be considered an impartial
tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention because it was the
President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court who had lodged the
petition and that the same President had appointed the members of the Chamber
and the judge-rapporteur.53
The Lithuanian government argued that the power of the President to lodge
petitions with the Supreme Court requesting the repeal of judgments by lower
courts is based on the need to prevent judicial error; that the domestic statutes gave
46See, e.g., Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, paras. 88-90. Prior to this, the Court had always
assumed that the treaty did not regulate the assignment of cases, or at least that it was not an element
relevant to the ‘establishment of the court’. See ECtHR 9March 1999, Case No. 32813/96, Lindner
v Germany.
47Daktaras v Lithuania, supra n. 28, para. 17. See also Igor Kabanov v Russia, supra n. 28.
48 ibid., para. 19.
49 ibid., para. 21.
50 ibid., para. 22.
51 ibid., para. 23.
52 ibid., para. 25.
53 ibid., para. 28.
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the President only organisational functions; that the President did not take part in
the examination of the case; and that he had no legal power to inﬂuence the
Chamber’s decision or to otherwise exert inappropriate pressure on the Chamber’s
judges. The Government moreover presented 11 decisions by the Supreme Court
in which petitions by the President of the Supreme Court or its Criminal Division
had been rejected by the Supreme Court.54
The Court rejected the arguments made by the government and found a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention. It held that the applicant’s fears about the
impartiality of the Chamber were justiﬁed.55 The fact that the President of the
Criminal Division of the Supreme Court had requested conﬁrmation of a decision
that was detrimental to the applicant was evidence that the President had taken
sides.56 Because he had, moreover, appointed the judges of the Chamber and the
judge-rapporteur, the impression was created that the judges who had heard the
case had been subject to pressure to decide in accordance with the wishes of their
President.57 The Court stated:
‘[W]hen the President of the Criminal Division not only takes up the prosecution
case but also, in addition to his organisational and managerial functions, constitutes
the court, it cannot be said that, from an objective standpoint, there are sufﬁcient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the absence of inappropriate
pressure’.58
54 ibid., para. 29.
55 ibid., para. 38.
56 ibid., para. 35.
57Cf. ECtHR 4 March 2015, Case No. 36073/04, Fazlı Aslaner v Turkey, in which the General
Assembly of the Supreme Administrative Court heard an appeal in a case that a Division of the Court
had ruled on earlier. The members of that Division were also members of the General Assembly. One
of them, a vice-president of the court, even presided over the General Assembly. The Strasbourg
Court ruled that this constituted a violation of Art. 6 of the Convention because it was not
‘absolutely necessary’ for the three judges to sit on the bench of the General Assembly (para. 40).
Moreover, the Court considered that the fact that one of the three judges had presided over the
General Assembly as vice-president was an ‘additional circumstance incompatible with the
appearance of impartiality’ (para. 41). One could argue that the latter argument refers to internal
judicial independence, since it points out that the presiding judge was not only a member of the
division that had ruled on the case earlier but was also a vice-president of the court. Such judicial
ofﬁcials are (by law or by practice) important ﬁgures in court administration, and therefore not easily
contradicted by other judges. However, since the Strasbourg does not explicitly adopt this line of
reasoning in Fazlı Aslaner v Turkey or in other similar cases, I have not included it in my set of cases
on internal judicial independence.
58Daktaras v Lithuania, supra n. 28, para. 36. It continues: ‘The fact that the President’s
intervention was prompted by the ﬁrst-instance judge only aggravates the situation’. Cf. Igor
Kabanov v Russia, supra n. 28, para. 42.
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The fact that, in other cases, a President’s petition had not been granted did not
change the Court’s view: every case must be assessed on its own merits.59
The power to remove a case from a judge is a variant of the power to assign a
case to a speciﬁc judge or judicial panel. Most Strasbourg cases on internal judicial
independence deal with this variant. By removing a case from a judge, the impression
could arise that the ﬁrst judge intended to decide the case in a way that would
contradict the wishes of the person who assigned the case.60 A striking example of this
isMoiseyev v Russia. The applicant had been indicted for treason. At trial, the president
of the court replaced all the judges of the chamber hearing the case no less than three
times. The Court considered this to be a violation of Article 6 of the Convention
because the applicant was justiﬁed in the impression that the judges had been replaced
because they intended to decide differently from what the president had in mind.61
Having the power to change the legal status of the judge
If a judicial colleague has not exercised any powers with regard to a speciﬁc case, as
in the examples above, the Court examines whether there are (other) powers he
can wield to exert pressure on the judge. At this point, it is important to stress that
a violation of internal judicial independence does not require that the colleague has
actually exercised his powers or even merely threatened to exercise them. This
criterion, therefore, differs substantially from the previous one. The Court stated:
‘the question is whether the powers conferred on the court presidents under the
[domestic] law were capable of generating latent pressures resulting in judges’
subservience to their judicial superiors or, at least, making individual judges
reluctant to contradict their president’s wishes, that is to say, of having “chilling”
effects on the internal independence of judges’.62
As mentioned, the Court also takes into account that, within courts, the exercise of
certain managerial powers – and the resulting pressure – is inevitable. The mere
fact that a colleague can exercise these powers over a judge is therefore insufﬁcient
to assume that inadmissible pressure in the sense of Article 6 of the Convention
59 ibid., para. 37. Another example in which the Strasbourg Court ﬁnds that a president of a court
has tried to inﬂuence the outcome of a case by taking a procedural decision, is ECtHR 26 July 2007,
Case No. 29294/02, Hirschhorn v Romania, paras. 76-78.
60See also ECtHR 5 October 2010, Case No. 19334/03, DMD Group, a.s. v Slovakia, in which a
judicial colleague re-assigned the case to himself. The Court held that this re-assignment violated Art.
6 of the Convention.
61Moiseyev v Russia, supra n. 28, paras. 181-185. A comparable situation appears in Sutyagin v
Russia, supra, n. 28. For an example in which a case was not reassigned within a court but referred to
another court, see Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary, supra n. 24.
62Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, para. 91.
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has been exerted.63 The Court’s examination, therefore, focuses on other powers,
namely powers that can lead to changes in the legal status of the judge. In practice,
the Court focuses on the power to promote judges or to impose disciplinary
sanctions on them. It does so because these powers, as the Court states, ‘potentially
have the most signiﬁcant impact on the internal independence of judges’.64
Gazeta Ukraine-Tsentr v Ukraine illustrates how the Court conducts such an
examination.65 In a newspaper published by the applicant, the applicant had reported
on a press conference in which the president of a local court –who was also a candidate
in amayoral election – had been accused by a journalist of having had put out a contract
for the murder of the applicant. The president then sued the journalist for defamation.
Another court than that of the president heard the defamation case and ordered the
applicant to pay the president compensation. The Court of Appeal conﬁrmed that
judgment. In Strasbourg, the applicant argued that neither court could be deemed
impartial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. He argued that, although
a different court than that of the president had heard his case, the president was also the
chairman of the Regional Council of Judges, under whose authority both the Court of
First Instance and the Court of Appeal fell, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled
to propose to the Council that disciplinary proceedings be instituted against the judges
and that another decision affecting their legal status be taken. The applicant argued that
the judges of these courts, therefore, lacked the appearance of impartiality. The Court
agreed and ruled that Article 6 of the Convention had been violated.66
… tries to inﬂuence the judge’s decision in a concrete case
The mere fact that a colleague of the judge has used powers with regard to the
handling of a speciﬁc case or has (other) powers he can use to exert pressure on the
judge does not mean that he has actually tried to inﬂuence the judge. For example,
63 ibid., para. 91.
64 ibid., paras. 92-93.
65See also Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 28, paras. 36-39.
66Gazeta Ukraine-Tsentr vUkraine, supra n. 28, paras. 34-35. The Court furthermore considered
it relevant that plaintiff had already asked the Supreme Court, even before the handling of his case
had started, to transfer the case to an entirely different court for the same reasons that he presented in
Strasbourg. The Supreme Court, in a decision issued by its vice-president, granted this request but
regarded the case in ﬁrst instance as completed, so that the verdict had no consequences for the
current proceedings. The Court stated: ‘Although this decision by the Deputy President of the
Supreme Court did not state clearly the reasons for the transfer, it suggested that the applicant
company’s fear about a risk of bias of the courts in the Kirovograd region was not without substance.
Therefore, in the Court’s view, the applicant company’s fears that judges of ﬁrst-instance and
appellate courts lacked impartiality can be held to be objectively justiﬁed. Moreover, the higher
courts, in dealing with the applicant company’s appeals, disregarded its submissions to this effect’
(para. 34).
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a case can rightly be assigned to a different judge if, for example, the ﬁrst judge has
fallen ill. There is also nothing illegal about a judge being warned that disciplinary
measures might be issued against him if, for example, he has neglected the duties
of his ofﬁce. The assertion that a judicial colleague has actually tried to inﬂuence
the judge must, therefore, be proven in both cases. Providing such evidence is
difﬁcult because the intent to inﬂuence is rarely openly expressed.
Agrokompleks v Ukraine, discussed above, is an exception to the rule that
judicial inﬂuencing does not occur out in the open.67 In that case, various
government ofﬁcials, including the Speaker of Parliament, the PrimeMinister and
the President of Ukraine, urged the president of a domestic court to repeal or
reconsider a decision of ‘his’ court.68 Eventually, the court president instructed his
two deputies to review that ruling,69 which the court eventually did.70 The
Strasbourg Court ruled, inter alia, that the instruction, given by the president of
the court to his two deputies, to reconsider an earlier judgment contravened the
Convention as it violated the principle of internal judicial independence.71
Usually, however, attempts to inﬂuence judges are discreet. Proving that a
judge has been inﬂuenced (or that an attempt thereto has been made) is therefore
quite difﬁcult. Hence, the Court has simpliﬁed the burden of proof with regard to
judicial inﬂuencing, basing it on the general rule that Article 6 of the Convention is
not only violated when a judge is not independent or impartial but also when there are
legitimate doubts about his independence or impartiality. In practice, this requirement
of ‘objective’ independence and impartiality72 results in the applicant focusing on
establishing doubt about the judge’s independence and impartiality; in response, the
state will then argue that such doubt cannot be held objectively justiﬁed.73
67See, the text accompanying n. 36.
68 ibid., para. 13.
69 ibid., paras. 70 and 138.
70 ibid., paras. 71-72.
71 ibid., para. 139.
72With regard to impartiality, see, for example, ECtHR 23 April 2015, Case No. 29369/10,
Morice v France, para. 73 (‘According to the Court’s settled case-law, the existence of impartiality for
the purposes of Article 6 § 1 must be determined according to a subjective test where regard must be
had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge held
any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by
ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufﬁcient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality’). It is less clear that the same
distinction would apply for independence, but see, for example, Kleyn et al. v The Netherlands, supra
n. 11, in which the Court considered that it needed to determine whether the Administrative
Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State ‘had the requisite “appearance” of independence’
(para. 193).
73Of course, the following does not alter the fact that applications before the Strasbourg Court are
inadmissible if the applicant has not exhausted all domestic remedies against an actual or potential
infringement of internal judicial independence: see Zaytsev v Russia, supra n. 28.
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To show how this simpliﬁed burden of proof works out for both the applicant
and the respondent state, it is again necessary to differentiate between situations in
which a judicial colleague (a) has exercised powers with regard to the handling of a
case which is (or was) assigned to the judge, and situations (b) in which he has the
power to change the legal status of the judge, irrespective of whether he actually
uses that power.
For the applicant, the foregoing mitigates the burden of proof. He no longer
has to provide a ‘smoking gun’. Instead, the focus is on establishing that there
could be doubts about the independence and impartiality of the judge who heard
the case. To understand what this burden of proof requires, it is important to stress
that a violation of Article 6 of the Convention of the Strasbourg Court does not
require that the attempted inﬂuencing was successful. Under the established case
law, it is sufﬁcient that ofﬁcials from the legislative or executive branch merely try
to inﬂuence the judge. In such cases, the Court considers that the mere attempt to
inﬂuence a judge reveals such a lack of respect for the judicial ofﬁce that there is
sufﬁcient reason to doubt that the judge is independent or impartial.74 It is fair to
assume that the same applies if an ofﬁcial within the judiciary attempts to
inﬂuence a judge.75 In order to explain how this alleviation of the burden of proof
works in practice, it is again necessary to differentiate between two situations.
If a judicial colleague has exercised powers with regard to the handling of a
speciﬁc case such as re-assigning the case or appointing a judge-rapporteur, that
mere fact creates doubt about the impartiality and independence of the judge who
hears the case. Usually, however, there is additional evidence of judicial
inﬂuencing or attempts thereto, but such additional evidence is not necessary to
establish the required doubt. Moiseyev v Russia, discussed above, shows this. In
that case, the president of the court repeatedly replaced the entire judicial panel
trying the case; in fact, the case was re-assigned no less than three times.76 The
Strasbourg Court stated that the fact that the panels had been replaced was enough
to raise doubts about the independence and impartiality of the judges who
eventually decided the case.77
74Agrokompleks v Ukraine, supra n. 28, para. 134, with reference to ECtHR 25 July 2002, Case
No. 48553/99, Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, para. 80 (‘The Court sees no reason to speculate on
what effect such interventions may have had on the course of the proceedings in issue, but ﬁnds that
in the circumstances of the present case the applicant company’s concerns as to the independence
and impartiality of the tribunals were not unreasonable. Coming from the executive branch of the
State, such interventions nonetheless reveal a lack of respect for the judicial ofﬁce itself’).
75 If the exerted pressure has in fact had an effect, the Court then usually mentions this. See, e.g.,
Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 28, para. 37.
76Moiseyev v Russia, supra n. 28.
77The Court considered in this regard that there were also no procedural guarantees that could
undo this appearance. I will discuss the importance of these procedural guarantees below.
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If the judicial colleague has not exercised any power with regard to the handling
of a speciﬁc case but does have the power to change the legal status of the judge,
more evidence is needed to establish the necessary doubt that a violation of
internal judicial independence has taken place. Additional facts and circumstances
are needed, as Khrykin v Russia shows.78 In that case, the applicant had asked the
authorities to upgrade his retirement pension retroactively. A judge of the
Elektrostal Town Court granted that request. After the judgment became ﬁnal,
the pension fund lodged an application for supervisory review of that judgment
with the Moscow Regional Court. That application was never examined.
However, the President of the Court wrote a letter to the judge of the ﬁrst-
instance court, stating that he considered the latter’s decision to be incompatible
with the case law of the Supreme Court, ‘a judicial error’ that ‘cannot be regarded
lawful’. Therefore, the President of Regional Court wrote, the case should be
reconsidered on the basis of newly-discovered circumstances.79 The pension fund
later asked the Court of First Instance to reopen the case. The latter agreed and
subsequently rejected the applicant’s claim to upgrade his retirement pension. Its
ﬁndings were identical to the arguments put forward in the letter sent by the
President of the Regional Court.80 In Strasbourg, the applicant argued that the
President’s letter had unduly inﬂuenced the judgment of the ﬁrst-instance court.
The Court agreed. It reached that conclusion after pointing out a number of
additional circumstances. First, the President of the Regional Court never decided
on the application for supervisory review, as required by law, but instead wrote a
letter to the judge of the Court of First Instance.81 Second, unlike the government,
the Court found that the President’s letter had exerted undue pressure on the
judge because of the language used to qualify the judge’s decision: a ‘judicial error’
that ‘cannot be regarded lawful’.82 Third, the Court noted that the President is
empowered to bring disciplinary proceedings against a judge for committing a
disciplinary offence. Such proceedings can lead to early termination of ofﬁce.
‘[E]rroneous application of the law’ can constitute such a disciplinary offence.83
Having noted these additional facts and circumstances, the Court concluded that
the applicant’s fear that the court of ﬁrst instance was not independent was
justiﬁed.84
78See also the identical Baturlova v Russia, supra n. 23. Cf. Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v
Portugal, supra n. 11, paras. 155 and 163, in which the Court held that such additional facts and
circumstances were absent, so there was – at that point – no violation of Art. 6 of the Convention.
79Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 28, para. 8.
80 ibid., paras. 9-11.
81 ibid., para. 32.
82 ibid., para. 35.
83 ibid., para. 36.
84 ibid., paras. 38-39.
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If the applicant successfully raises doubts about the independence and
impartiality of the judge in question, the respondent state will try to establish that
those doubts are not legitimate, that is, that they cannot be held objectively
justiﬁed. As a rule of thumb, the Strasbourg Court considers this to be the case if
domestic law provides sufﬁcient procedural guarantees to prevent judicial
inﬂuencing.
In the Court’s case law, such safeguards are particularly important when a case
is assigned to anyone other than the usual judge or when a case has been re-
assigned. For example, inMiracle Europe Kft v Hungary the Court emphasised the
importance of regulating, by law, the way cases are distributed among the judges of
a court and warned against the lack of clear and transparent legal criteria for case
distribution:
‘that situation puts at risk the appearance of impartiality, by allowing speculation
about the inﬂuence of political or other forces on the assignee court and the judge in
charge, even where the assignment of the case to the speciﬁc judge in itself follows
transparent criteria’.85
InMiracle Europe Kft vHungary, such a legal framework was lacking.86 As a result,
the judge who distributed cases had far-reaching discretionary power. The
Strasbourg Court considered, therefore, that:
‘the allocation or reassignment of cases could be misused as a means of putting
pressure on judges by for instance overburdening them with cases or by assigning
them only low-proﬁle ones. It is also possible to direct politically sensitive cases to
certain judges and to avoid allocating them to others’.87
The Court concluded that because of the absence of procedural guarantees – such
as legislation that signiﬁcantly restricts the way cases are distributed – the
85Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary, supra n. 24, para. 58.
86For a case in which an adequate legal framework for the distribution of cases among judges was
available, see Iwańczuk v Poland, supra n. 28. The Court there emphasised that domestic law
regulated the distribution of cases and that although it also provided for exceptions, it also required
that the reasons justifying such exceptions be expressly stated. Moreover, the Strasbourg Court
attached importance to the fact that the applicant’s allegation – that his case had been improperly
assigned – had been carefully examined by the Supreme Court and found ‘entirely ill-founded’.
87Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary, supra n. 24, para. 58. In previous cases, the Court was less
stringent, only requiring, for example, that the reassignment had been properly motivated (Bochan v
Ukraine, supra n. 28, para. 72). It has also on occasion considered whether legal remedies were
available against a reassignment decision (Moiseyev v Russia, supra n. 28, para. 182; Sutyagin v Russia,
supra n. 28, para. 192).
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applicant’s fears that his case was not heard by ‘a tribunal established by law’, as
Article 6 of the Convention requires, were objectively justiﬁed.88
Procedural guarantees are also important when a judicial ofﬁcial exerts pressure
on a judge by using or referring to his power to change the legal status of the judge.
Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia shows this.89 After the applicant had suffered a road trafﬁc
accident, the Zlatar Municipal Court ordered the insurance company to pay
compensation for the resulting damage. Afterwards, the Municipal Court
modiﬁed its decision; the interest it had calculated was too high. At that point,
however, the insurance company had already paid out the initial judgment, and
the applicant refused to pay back the amount in excess. The President of the
Municipal Court – after having received a letter from the insurance company –
ﬁled a criminal complaint against the applicant. He stated that the applicant had
refused to return the unlawfully obtained amount, that the insurance company
had already instituted civil proceedings against the applicant, and that the
applicant’s refusal to return the amount ‘contains elements of criminal liability’.90
As mentioned above, the insurance company had already instituted civil
proceedings against the applicant to recover the allegedly wrong amount. The
Zlatar Municipal Court – the court of the president who had ﬁled the criminal
complaint against the applicant – ruled against the applicant. The applicant
appealed to the Zlatar County Court. At the same time, she asked for a transfer of
jurisdiction from both the Zlatar Municipal Court and the Zlatar County Court,
because both courts, in her view, could not be expected to be impartial in the
examination of her appeal, given that the President of the Municipal Court, who
had ﬁled a criminal complaint against her, had in the meantime become the
President of the County Court.91 The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s
request for a transfer of jurisdiction.92 The County Court then upheld the
judgment of the Municipal Court.93 In Strasbourg, the question was whether the
judges of either court at which the applicant’s case had been heard in civil
proceedings were sufﬁciently independent of the aforementioned president.94
The Court noted ﬁrst that, under Croatian law, the president, rather than
performing any judicial functions, only has administrative tasks. The president,
therefore, could not ‘take advantage of his hierarchical position to give the
rapporteur or other members of the panel instructions as to how to decide on the
88Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary, supra n. 24, para. 67. See also Igor Kabanov v Russia, supra n. 28,
paras. 40-44.
89See also Salov v Ukraine, supra n. 28, para. 83.
90Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, supra n. 21, para. 9.
91 ibid., para. 17.
92 ibid., para. 19.
93 ibid., para. 20.
94 ibid., para. 87.
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applicant’s appeal, and there is nothing to indicate that he did so in her case’.95 He
was, however, charged with the assignment of cases to judges, but – as the Court
noted – Croatian law ‘contained rules governing the distribution of cases to judges
within courts, which means that cases were not distributed by the court presidents
at their own discretion’. The Court, therefore, concluded that Croatian law
‘provided for adequate safeguards against arbitrary exercise of court presidents’
duty to (re)assign cases to judges’.96 Next, the Court examined ‘whether there
were any other elements in the (hierarchical) relationship between judges who
decided the applicant’s appeal and the president of the Zlatar County Court,
which were capable of curbing their internal independence’.97
The Court next found that court presidents, inter alia, play a role in the
appraisal of judges and have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
judges and to temporarily suspend judges. ‘However’, the Court continued, ‘in neither
of these areas the court presidents had exclusive powers or unfettered discretion’. For
example, a judge who receives a negative appraisal can appeal against it to the president
of a higher court; while a court president can institute disciplinary proceedings against
a judge, the power to impose a disciplinary sanction lies exclusively with the National
Judicial Council; and, ﬁnally, the power to temporally suspend a judge can only be
exercised when a judge is being held in detention.98 The Court concluded:
‘For these reasons, the Court considers that Croatian law at the material time had
adequate mechanisms to prevent improper interferences coming from within the
judiciary, and that the powers vested in the court presidents could not have
reasonably been viewed as running counter to, or having “chilling” effects on, the
internal independence of judges. … Therefore, the Court considers that the
applicant’s fears as regards the lack of impartiality of the Zlatar County Court were
not objectively justiﬁed’.99
Article 6 of the Convention had therefore not been violated.100
The Strasbourg Court has thus developed some clear rules with regard to the
concept of internal judicial independence. What is striking, however, is that the Court
95 ibid., para. 88.
96 ibid., para. 89.
97 ibid., para. 91.
98 ibid., para. 92.
99 ibid., paras. 94-95.
100 ibid., para. 97. Two of the seven judges wrote a dissenting opinion. They considered Art. 6 of
the ECHR to have been violated because, in their opinion, the report by the President did pertain to
the outcome of the civil proceedings (para. 5). In addition, contrary to the majority of the Court,
they considered the inﬂuence of the President on the individual judge to be substantial. In any case,
they considered that the possibility of appeal against decisions taken by the President that are
disadvantageous for judges does not sufﬁciently mitigate this inﬂuence (paras. 6-9).
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judgments discussed above were issued against only a limited number of post-
communist member states of the Council of Europe. This raises the question whether
the concept of internal judicial independence is only relevant for those member states,
other whether it has also consequences for the established democracies of the Council
of Europe. I will address this question in the next paragraph.
Internal judicial independence in established democracies: the
Netherlands as a case study
The fact that judgments of the Strasbourg Court in which it has held that internal
judicial independence had been violated have been handed down against a limited
number of post-Communist states is, in my opinion, due to two circumstances.
First, due to their Communist past, these countries lack a long-standing, deeply
ingrained culture in which the independence of the individual judge is considered
important. Second, many former Communist countries opted for a model of
judicial self-government after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In such a model, the
independence of the individual judge may suffer, since there is no external control
over those who supervise judges. This risk is enhanced if the judicial supervisor has
not been exposed to a culture in which the independence of individual judges is
considered important; this is exactly the case in the former Communist countries.
The fact that up until now violations of internal judicial independence have
only been issued against former Communist countries could easily lead to the
conclusion that the case law on internal judicial independence is only applicable to
those new democracies that have a model of judicial self-government and that do not
have a long-standing judicial culture which acknowledges the importance of the
independence of individual judges. But such a conclusion is, in my opinion,
unjustiﬁed. The mere fact that no cases exist in which the Strasbourg Court has
condemned an established democracy for a violation of internal judicial independence
does not mean that the internal-independence model in those countries is necessarily
in line with the Convention. In that respect, it is important to realise that the
Strasbourg tenet of internal judicial independence is intended to protect citizens rather
than judges: citizens are entitled to an independent and impartial trial. The fact that no
citizens of established democracies have complained to the Strasbourg Court about
violations of internal judicial independence is probably because of the relatively great
level of trust they place in judges and the judicial organisation; fears that ‘their’ judge
has been put under pressure will not quickly arise.101
101The EU Justice Scoreboard 2018 provides the necessary information in this regard for EU
countries (see < ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en> ).
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To support the proposition that the Court’s case law is also relevant for the
established democracies of the Council of Europe, I examine whether the court
system of the Netherlands – an established democracy in which judicial self-
government is rather limited and the importance of judicial autonomy is deeply
ingrained in the legal culture – has potentially problematic proﬁles in the light of
the Court’s principles on internal judicial independence.102
In this examination, I limit myself to the relationship between Dutch judges in
courts of ﬁrst instance and appellate courts on the one hand, and the executive
ofﬁcials of those courts on the other.103 As such, I do not consider the situation
here of certain administrative law tribunals and the Supreme Court (the court of
cassation), since the internal organisation of those bodies differs signiﬁcantly from
the organisation of courts of ﬁrst instance and appellate courts.
Before 2002, judges essentially ruled over Dutch courts. The so-called general
assembly of a court (its ‘gerechtsvergadering’), consisting of all the judges of a
particular court, was its highest executive body. It possessed, for example, the
power to institute court chambers, distribute cases, and recommend persons to the
Crown for judicial appointment. From the 1980s onward, however, a practice
emerged whereby the general assembly delegated its powers to an executive board
headed by the court president. In 2002, the law on the Dutch court
administration changed signiﬁcantly. First, the executive boards were given a
basis in legislation. Nowadays, the Dutch courts of ﬁrst instance and appellate
courts each have a board consisting of three persons of whom at least two are
judges.104 One of the two judges acts as the board’s chairman and is referred to as
its president.105 The Government appoints106 and dismisses court board
102For a description of the Dutch judicial organisation in English, see P.P.T. Bovend’Eert,
‘Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers: A Case Study in Modern Court
Management’, 22(2) European Public Law (2016) p. 333; Ph.M. Langbroek, ‘Organization
Development of the Dutch Judiciary, between Accountability and Judicial Independence’,
International Journal for Court Administration (April 2010) p. 1; R. de Lange, ‘Judicial
Independence in The Netherlands’, in A. Seibert-Fohr (eds.), Judicial Independence in
Transition (Springer 2012) p. 231.
103 In actual practice, the sectoral, departmental, and team chairmen are likewise important, since
they can often exercise the powers of the judicial board by virtue of a mandate on the basis of the
management regulations of the court involved. See, for example, Art. 4, subclause 4, of the
Management Regulations of the Gelderland Court (Staatscourant [Government Gazette] 2013, no.
9212). In fact, the team chairman does not always have to be (and in some cases is not) a judge
(Kamerstukken I [Parliamentary Papers I] 2011/12, 32 891, E, p. 5).
104Art. 15(1) and 15(2) Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
105Art. 15(3) Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
106Art. 15(4) Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
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members.107 Each court board is responsible for the organisation and
management of the respective court. Second, a Council for the Judiciary was
introduced. Its members, of whom at least half must be judges,108 are also
appointed109 and dismissed110 by the Government. The Council operates as a
buffer between the Government and the courts. It plays an important role in court
ﬁnancing: it draws up (non-binding) budget proposals and apportions the
budget allocated by Parliament and the Government. It moreover provides
support to and supervises the court boards. According to the Judiciary
(Organisation) Act, the court boards and the Council for the Judiciary may not,
in exercising their powers, involve themselves in the handling and decision-
making process of a concrete case or case categories.111
Upon examination of whether the Dutch court system has potentially
problematic proﬁles in the light of the light of the Court’s principles on internal
judicial independence, three powers wielded by the members of Dutch court boards
turn out to be particularly relevant: the power to assign (or re-assign) cases to judges,
the power to impose disciplinary penalties or to take the initiative thereto, and the
power to promote judges. As regards each of these powers, I discuss whether Dutch
law has potentially problematic proﬁles.112 I then present a brief conclusion.
107Art. 16 Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act]. The Council for the
Judiciary prepares a non-binding recommendation for their appointment (Art. 15(5) Wet op de
Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organization) Act]).
108Art. 84(4) Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
109Art. 84(3) Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
110Art. 86 Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
111Art. 23.2, 24.2 and 96Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act]. See P.
P.T. Bovend’Eert (with the cooperation of C.A.J.M. Kortmann), Rechterlijke organisatie, rechters en
rechtspraak [Judicial Organisation, Judges and the Administration of Justice] (Kluwer 2013) p. 103-
104; P.M. van den Eijnden, Onafhankelijkheid van de rechter in constitutioneel perspectief [Judicial
Independence in a Constitutional Law Perspective] (Kluwer 2011) p. 243–255. These prohibitions are
thus tied to the (speciﬁc) powers of court administrations and the Council for the Judiciary. The
legislature explicitly stated that it was not the intention to recognise or establish internal judicial
independence, in general (Kamerstukken II [Parliamentary Papers II] 1999/00, 27 182, no. 3, p. 68
and 83-84).
112 In the Netherlands, there is debate on whether the Council for the Judiciary and the judicial
boards, by exercising their ﬁnancial powers, might not have excessive inﬂuence on the way justice is
administered. For example, ﬁnancial incentives are used to ensure that cases are handled efﬁciently,
making it less worthwhile to handle cases by a three judge panel instead of by a single judge or to hear
many witnesses. I shall leave that discussion up to others. See, on this subject, Bovend’Eert, supra
n. 102.
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Case assignment
The power to assign cases lies with the court board,113 which establishes rules of
procedure for that purpose.114 In practice, however, those rules are not hard and
fast, and the ofﬁcials who assign cases (or who are mandated to do so) have great
discretionary power. The Dutch practice of case assignment is thus far from
transparent. This can lead to judges being challenged, as happened recently during
the criminal proceedings against Geert Wilders, a member of the Lower House for
the PVV, for causing insult and stirring up hatred. The judges hearing the case had
been selected based on the criterion that they were not and had never been
members of a political party. That raised the question of whether this could be
considered a relevant criterion and, if so, what this meant for judges who were
members of a political party.115
This discretionary power in the assignment of cases puts the Netherlands in
risky territory, as has been noted on various occasions,116 especially when no
explanation can be given for the choice of criteria, objective or otherwise, used to assign
a given case to a particular judge. This legal gap was meant to be bridged by a Case
Assignment Code, which a taskforce started work on in 2012. Three years later,
however, it was decided to incorporate the aim of improving case assignment into a
broader computerisation scheme.117 The Minister of Justice expressed the expectation
that a ‘scheduling and planning tool’would be ‘partially operating in several districts’118
by mid-2017. However, at the time of writing this paper, no such tool is operational.
Court boards are, in addition, free to assign judges of the court to different
teams within the same court; a judge could, for example, be assigned to no longer
handle criminal cases but only private law cases. As a result, this power functions as
a variant of the power to assign cases to a speciﬁc judge. For the judge in question,
such a reassignment could also prove unwelcome: the judge might, for example,
have limited knowledge of private law, or derive greater fulﬁlment from the
adjudication of criminal cases. The threat of reassignment by a court board can
thus be an effective way to force an obstreperous judge to back down. Research
113Art. 41 Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status) Act].
114Art. 20.1 Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
115See, on this subject, R.J.B. Schutgens, ‘Dit is de rechter die de wet u toewijst’, RM Themis
(2016) p. 113-114.
116M.L. van Emmerik et al., Systeemwaarborgen voor de kernwaarden van de rechtspraak (Research
Memoranda 2014/2) (Raad voor de Rechtspraak 2014) p. 95-103; R. Baas, ‘Hoe een zaak bij de
rechter komt’, in R. Baas et al. (eds.), Rechtspleging en rechtsbescherming (Kluwer 2015); M.L.
Emmerik and Y. Schuurmans, ‘Meer transparantie bij rechterlijke zaakstoedeling dringend gewenst’,
12 NJB (2016) p. 795.
117The programme is referred to as KEI, which stands for Kwaliteit en Innovatie Rechtspraak
[Quality and Innovation of the Judiciary].
118Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Appendix to Parliamentary Papers II] 2015/16, 2379, p. 2.
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among court presidents shows, by the way, that the majority would opt to impose
the sanction of transfer if a judge regularly ignored a national sentencing criterion
for a speciﬁc offence.119 In this respect, the Dutch legal system seems to have
potentially problematic proﬁles in the light of the Court’s principles on internal
judicial independence.
The power to impose disciplinary penalties
The threat that the power to impose disciplinary penalties will be used can be a
source of pressure on judges. Under current Dutch law, only two types of
disciplinary penalties can be imposed:120 a written warning or a dismissal. A
written warning can only be imposed by a board member of the court in which the
judge is in function, i.e. its president.121 Disciplinary dismissal of a judge can only
be ordered by the Supreme Court, and must be based on a requisition of the
Court’s – independent – procurator general.122 This penalty can therefore not be
imposed or requested by courts of ﬁrst instance or appellate courts, which is the
reason I do not address that particular subject here.
Should the impression arise that a judge might decide in a particular way
simply to avoid the possibility of a disciplinary warning, procedural guarantees can
help prevent that impression from becoming reality. Examples of such guarantees
are limitations on the discretion of the penalising authority and the possibility to
appeal against sanctions. In the Netherlands, these procedural guarantees appear
to be sufﬁciently available. Although the grounds for imposing such sanctions are
ample,123 the Dutch legal system recognises no grounds for imposing disciplinary
penalties on judges due to the content of a verdict,124 as is the case in, for example,
119D. Allewijn and A.F.M. Brenninkmeijer, ‘De aanspreekbaarheid van de rechter’, Trema (2002)
p. 266.
120An Act has been passed but not yet entered into force that will broaden the range of disciplinary
penalties. See Staatsblad [Bulletin of Acts and Decrees] 2018, 298. The Act will introduce the
possibility to withhold up to half a month’s salary and to suspend a judge from ofﬁce for the duration
of a maximum of three months. Only the Supreme Court will be able to impose these two new
disciplinary penalties on judges. By entering into force, the new Act will not in fact change the
substance of this paragraph.
121Art. 46d(1)(a) Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status) Act].
See also Art. 116(4) Grondwet [Constitution].
122Art. 117(3) of the Dutch Constitution in combination with Art. 46d.2 and 46o ff of Wet
rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status) Act].
123Possibly too broad in speciﬁc cases, according to the Strasbourg Court. See my case note to
Volkov v Ukraine, supra n. 35, in EHRC 2013, p. 80.
124Supreme Court 15 December 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BK6646, para. 3.7. Dismissal for
incompetence is, however, conceivable if the judge ‘consistently applies old law because he
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Russia.125 As a result, the power of the president of a court to impose disciplinary
warnings cannot readily be wielded to force a judge to issue a speciﬁc verdict. In
addition, appeals against disciplinary warnings imposed by court presidents can be
lodged with the Central Appeals Tribunal, an independent judicial authority.126 Hence,
as far as this point is concerned, the Dutch legal system seems to provide sufﬁcient
guarantees in the light of the Court’s principles on internal judicial independence.
The power to promote judges
Lastly, the power to promote judges, for example to senior judge positions, can be
a source of pressure. In the Netherlands, recommendations to promote judges are
made by the court board.127 Following the advice of the Council for the Judiciary,
the Minister of Justice decides whether to recommend the candidate to the King
for appointment to the intended function.128 Promotion is thus dependant on an
initiative to that effect taken by the court board, which is then theoretically in a
position to exert pressure on any judge eager for such a promotion. In addition,
the court board – convening without its non-judicial member129 – conducts
judicial performance reviews,130 although that authority is generally exercised by
someone else, for example, the team chairman. Although performance reviews
must be seen as procedurally separate from promotion recommendations, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the outcome of those reviews will be considered when
deciding whether a judge is to be recommended for promotion. Although the
explanatory memorandum to the legal provision that instructs the court board to
conduct performance reviews states that the board may – in accordance with the
law131 – not involve itself ‘in the procedural handling of, the substantive
evaluation and the decision in a concrete case or in categories of cases’,132
Strasbourg case law shows that such an exception does not guarantee that the
regulation is in line with the Convention.133 What does help, however, is to limit
consistently fails to keep up his professional expertise’ (‘P-G Hoge Raad: ontslag rechter na onjuiste
beslissing niet mogelijk’, NJB (2009) p. 2791-2793).
125See, e.g., Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 28, para. 60.
126Art. 3(a), Bevoegdheidsregeling bestuursrechtspraak [Rules on jurisdiction governing
administrative decisions].
127Art. 5c(1) Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status) Act].
128Art. 5c(4) and 5c(5) Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status)
Act].
129Art. 37b(4) Besluit rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status)
Decree].
130Art. 37b Besluit rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren [Judicial Ofﬁcers (Legal Status) Decree].
131Art. 23(2) Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie [Judiciary (Organisation) Act].
132Staatsblad [Bulletin of Acts and Decrees] 2014, 50, p. 4.
133Cf. Daktaras v Lithuania, supra n. 28, para. 26, sub B (the Court assumes violation of the
internal judicial independence since the chairman of the criminal division of the Supreme Court had
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the discretion of the ofﬁce that conducts the performance review, for example by
establishing objective criteria for proper functioning and possible promotion.134
However, the Dutch judiciary has not established any such criteria. In that respect,
therefore, the Dutch law is potentially problematic in the light of the Court’s
principles on internal judicial independence.
Conclusion
Although the case-oriented approach of the Strasbourg Court does not always make
it easy to assess – strictly on the basis of the applicable rules of law and thus in the
absence of a concrete dispute – whether the national law of a member state meets
the requirements of the Convention, the abovemakes clear, in my opinion, that the
law on the Dutch court system has potentially problematic proﬁles in the light of
the Court’s principles on internal judicial independence, especially with regard to
case assignment and the power to promote judges. The fact that the two risk-
enhancing circumstances for violation of internal judicial independence do not
occur in the Netherlands – namely, a culture in which the importance of judicial
autonomy is not ingrained, and the existence of solid judicial self-government –
does not mean that internal judicial independence is properly guaranteed.
The Court’s recognition of internal judicial independence has thus led to a
consistent body of case law that is relevant not only to the post-Communist
member states of the Council of Europe but also to its established democracies,
such as the Netherlands. Now that the content and relevance of the Court’s case
law on internal judicial independence is clear, it is time to turn a critical eye to its
place within the broader context of the Strasbourg case law on Article 6.
A critical appraisal of the Court’s case law
With its recognition of the concept of internal judicial independence, the Strasbourg
Court has added a new and important element to its extensive case law on Article 6
proposed the reversal of a case by that same Supreme Court, had constituted the division and had
appointed the judge-rapporteur, even though under Lithuanian law he was explicitly prohibited
from exerting inﬂuence in the exercise of his administrative powers on judges or from otherwise
violating their independence).
134Note that the Convention does not guarantee ‘a right to appointment or promotion in the civil
service’ (e.g. ECtHR 28 August 1986, Case No. 9228/80, Glasenapp v Germany, paras. 48-49),
including in the judiciary (e.g. ECtHR [DA] 29 June 2004, Case No. 62584/00, Harabin v
Slovakia). Nor does the Convention protect a right to a fair competition procedure in a civil service
context (ECtHR [DA] 9 October 2012, Case No. 12628/09, Dzhidzheva-Trendaﬁlova v Bulgaria,
para. 38). However, when an applicant has on the basis of the domestic law of the Member State an
arguable right to promotion, and the domestic courts have the power to examine this claim, Article 6
of the Convention applies and guarantees the applicant a right to a fair trial before the domestic
courts (ECtHR 15 September 2015, Case No. 43800/12, Tsanova-Gecheva v Bulgaria, para. 84).
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of the Convention. The Court’s case law is often criticised for its lack of conceptual
coherence, especially because the Strasbourg Court usually does not distinguish
between the two key concepts of Article 6, namely that a tribunal should be
‘impartial’ as well as ‘independent’.135 It does so because, according to the Court,
these two concepts are difﬁcult to distinguish.136 Of course, this bears some truth.
Both requirements, after all, serve the same purpose: they are intended to ensure that
judges assess the cases assigned to them in an open-minded manner. Nevertheless,
the fact that the Court often fails to distinguish between the two concepts inevitably
leads to confusion between them. The case law on internal judicial independence
adds to this confusion; when violations of internal judicial independence are
determined, the Court has often concluded that the tribunal was ‘not impartial’,
instead of ‘not independent’. The Court apparently reasons that since the judge on
the case was being pressured, the parties to the proceedings were justiﬁed in fearing
that the court, rather than base its decision on objective arguments, would instead
bend to the will of the colleague who was trying to inﬂuence him.
Understandably, the Court often sees violations of internal judicial
independence through a prism of impartiality, although the requirement of an
independent tribunal is also frequently viewed from a separation-of-powers
perspective, notably in the scholarly literature on Article 6. There, judicial
independence has bearing solely on the relationship between the judiciary on the
one hand and the executive and the legislative branch of government on the other.
Internal judicial independence does not ﬁt in with this separation-of-powers
interpretation of judicial independence because it refers exclusively to the position
of the judge within the judiciary.
Although the Court’s approach to the concept of ‘internal judicial
independence’ is thus understandable, I nevertheless think that the Court’s
treatment of the concept as a special form of judicial impartiality should be avoided
for three reasons. First, because it is a departure from the way in which the concept
is used nowadays in international soft law, compromising the consistency of the
Strasbourg case law with standards of international law. Second, because the
concept of internal judicial independence is less likely to reach maturity if it is
absorbed by the more general case law on impartiality. Its maturation is important
because the practical relevance of the concept for the right to a fair trial continues to
grow, just as judicial self-government is still on the rise. It would, therefore, be
better, and more straightforward, to view the concept of internal judicial
independence as part of the requirement of an ‘independent’ tribunal. Third, and
most importantly, conceptual clarity is crucial for the effectiveness and
135E.g., T. Barkhuysen et al., ‘Right to a fair trial’, in P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of
the European Court of Human Rights (Intersentia 2018) p. 599.
136See, e.g., Baturlova v Russia, supra n. 23, para. 28.
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persuasiveness of the Court’s case law and, ultimately, also for the legitimacy of the
Strasbourg Court.
Two identical judgments, in both of which a violation of internal judicial
independence led the Strasbourg Court to conclude that there was a breach of the
Article 6 requirement that a tribunal be ‘independent’, show how this can be done.
First, the Court tries to untangle its own case law on independence and impartiality:
‘Independence of the judiciary refers to the necessary individual and institutional
independence that are required for impartial decision making. It thus characterises
both a state of mind and a set of institutional and operational arrangements. The
former is concerned with the judge’s impartiality and the latter with deﬁning
relations with other bodies, in particular other state powers, and are, sometimes,
indivisible’.137
The Court thus distinguishes between two types of judicial independence. On the
one hand, there is the independence of the individual judge, which the Court
deﬁnes as a certain ‘state of mind’ necessary for ‘impartial decision making’. This
independence of the individual judge relates to the Article 6 requirement that a
tribunal should be ‘impartial’. The institutional and operational arrangement for
impartial decision-making, on the other hand, relates to the Article 6 requirement
of an ‘independent’ tribunal. According to the Strasbourg Court, both
independence and impartiality thus aim to enable judges to decide cases
impartially, that is: fairly. The way they achieve this goal, however, differs:
independence does so by means of legal rules (‘institutional and operational
arrangements’) that deﬁne the position of the judge with respect to ‘other bodies,
in particular other state powers’; impartiality does so by protecting a certain ‘state
of mind’ on the part of the judge.
It should be noted that the Court, in this case, appears to deﬁne independence
within the meaning of Article 6 exclusively with regard to the position of the
individual judge in the state. Unlike the deﬁnition of judicial independence one
encounters in the literature, however, the Court does not reserve it strictly for the
relation between the court and the other two branches of government since it
speaks of ‘other bodies, in particular other state powers’. Next, the Court states
that the requirement of an ‘independent’ tribunal includes the concept of internal
judicial independence. It considers:
‘The Court notes that judicial independence also demands that individual judges be
free not only from undue inﬂuences outside the judiciary, but also from within. This
137Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 23, para. 28; Baturlova v Russia, supra n. 23, para. 28.
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internal judicial independence requires that they be free from instructions or
pressures from the fellow judges and vis-à-vis their judicial superiors’.138
I think that the incorporation of the concept of internal judicial independence into the
existing case law on judicial independence should be followed in other cases. It would be
helpful if the Court – in the mould of the reasoning in the above-cited case – explicitly
redrafted its deﬁnition of judicial independence. To this end, the Court should no
longer regard judicial independence exclusively in the light of the separation of powers,
but also in the light of the independent position of individual judges operating within
the state. Deﬁned thus, judicial independence would not only serve as a buffer against
the executive and legislative branches but also as a guarantee against the exertion of
undue inﬂuence on judges by ofﬁcials within the judicial branch. I tend toward this
solution, since the concept of internal judicial independence could remain as it
currently is, while allowing a meaningful distinction to be drawn between impartiality
(which continues to pertain to an independent state of mind on the part of the judge
in relation to the parties to the proceedings and their case) and independence (which
then relates to the position of the judge versus governmental ofﬁcials, in general).
Conclusion
The Strasbourg Court’s recognition of internal judicial independence reﬂects a
fundamental adjustment of the values underlying its case law on Article 6 of the
Convention. This recognition is a valuable adjustment of the Court’s long-standing
separation-of-powers perspective on judicial independence. The Court shows a
growing awareness of the importance of the independence of the individual judge,
and rightly so: this adjustment is invaluable in times when the judicial self-
government model of court governance turns out to have drawbacks of its own.
The consequences of this shift in the Court’s case law are most dramatically felt
in the formerly Communist countries represented in the Council of Europe; these
are so far the only countries condemned for violations of the principle of internal
judicial independence. As I have shown using the Netherlands as a case study,
however, the new Strasbourg standards may prove problematic also for the
established democracies of the Council of Europe.
Thus, the Strasbourg Court’s recognition of the concept of internal judicial
independence represents a fundamental adjustment to its case law that will bear
consequences for all the member states of the Council of Europe. To be fully
effective and persuasive, however, the concept of internal judicial independence
should be clariﬁed by the Court within the framework of Article 6, as suggested in
the previous pages. Only then can the concept of internal judicial independence
truly fulﬁl its purpose: enabling the individual judge to administer justice fairly.
138Khrykin v Russia, supra n. 23, para. 29; Baturlova v Russia, supra n. 23, para. 29.
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